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Reliability and Safety Prediction Methods
For Mission and Spaceport Operations
Dr. Marianna Pensky, University of Central Florida
Astrid E. Heard, NASA, J. F. Kennedy Space Center
Background
At KSC and other Space Flight Operations (SFO) NASA centers, a great deal of effort is
expended to collect, analyze and report statistical data on performance of space vehicle systems
during tests and operations. In all cases, an effort is made to mitigate the risk of failure and
improve safety and reliability by finding systems that may benefit from some sort of corrective
action. Statistical data summarizing performance of space vehicle systems can sometimes enable
evaluation of the best possible type of corrective action to use, such as replacement versus
redesign. However, complexity and time constraints of existing methods do not allow performing
this analysis on every system for every test or operation. So current practice stresses isolation of
the most vulnerable systems in order to perform more detailed analysis and corrective action, if
necessary. Ultimately, the final decision for vehicle launch is based on testing that all vehicle
systems are operating nominally, in the hope that all possible actions have been taken to ensure
these systems continue to operate safely and reliably.
In addition, Safety and Health data related to personnel issues is collected in the form of
metrics that count occurrences of events of interest. These events are generally relevant to
assuring that personnel are operating at optimal health and safety levels necessary for peak
performance of their duties and responsibilities, thereby contributing to the overall safety and
reliability of a mission. Metric data is usually evaluated quarterly using histograms for visual
interpretation of trends.
In view of the increasing complexity of spaceport operations, significant improvement
can be achieved by moving from ``snapshot” evaluation of trends towards tools for continuous or
automatic detection of unfavorable tendencies. Application of advanced statistical techniques for
trend analysis can help in such efforts. We propose the use of nonhomogeneous Poisson
processes to fit distributions of events, such as problems (failures) detected in a space vehicle
system, and applying empirical Bayes techniques ([3], [9]) to estimation of event intensity as well
as testing for possible change points in the intensity function [4].
It is important to note that the system level analysis being proposed is at a higher level
than the type of component reliability analysis performed by logistics and safety personnel such
as FMEA’s, Hazard Analysis, etc. Results of such component analysis is not currently integrated
into the system level analysis discussed above. However, once failure probabilities and trends are
established, Bayesian techniques can help to integrate such information in order to further refine
the results [9].

Current Practice
As one example of current practice, we describe a few of the processes used to maintain
reliability of the Shuttle Orbiter. Every six months, a five-year Orbiter Problem Trend Analysis
Report1 is produced, based on the JSC Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA)
1

SSMA-02-003, Orbiter Problem Trend Analysis Report – Covers Issue Date to 5 years prior

database. This report compares the problems reported on each major Orbiter subsystem and
dissects them with respect to quantity, frequency, severity and many other factors. Similar to the
“Triage Process” in an emergency room that allows a doctor to determine the most seriously
injured patients and treat them immediately, this report identifies the most “problematic” systems,
and thus could initiate analysis of a specific Orbiter subsystem. The Trend Analysis Report does
not distinguish between Orbiters, implying that the systems are basically equivalent on all four
Orbiters. Figure 1 contains a sample data summary for the Digital Processing System. Data for
each system is presented in the same manner. Statistics for multiple systems are then grouped on
a single spreadsheet for the purpose of identification of the highest risk systems based on the
problem report analysis.

Figure 1

Whether initiated by the Trend Analysis Report, by management direction, or some other
means, periodically an in-depth Reliability and Maintenance Analysis2 of an Orbiter system is
prepared. Reliability and maintenance analysis may indicate the need for some sort of corrective
action, redesign or replacement of systems or system components. If severity is significant, the
Orbiter will not be processed for a launch until an appropriate corrective action is taken. Various
methods of statistical analysis techniques, all perfectly valid, are currently utilized to reach
conclusions. However, the real problem stems from the fact that this is a “snapshot” analysis, and
no assessment of the condition of the system is performed until the next time a “snapshot”
analysis is completed.
As another example of current practice, we describe the Safety and Health Metrics, collected and
reported quarterly. Figure 2 shows one of these metrics, KSC Lost Time Injuries. Each metric is
the collection of counts representing occurrences of events of interest such as number of Lost
Time Injuries or number of Maximum Worktime Deviations within specified periods of time. The
data is presented via histograms. Evaluation is primarily based on the height of histogram bars,
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and no statistical analysis of trend is performed. In fact, on the basis of data presented in the
report, the annual trend cannot be evaluated until the year is over. Corrective action, if required,
cannot be initiated or suggested in a timely fashion using this methodology. While specific goals
are formulated, such as “decrease the number of Lost Time Injuries to zero”, there are no tools
other than visual judgment to assess progress.

Figure 2

Enhancement Options
The situations described above have several similarities. First, the data is represented in a
similar form. The events are recorded, then transformed into “bin counts” as the number of
events per fixed time intervals. Second, the questions of interest are similar: “Is the system
improving or deteriorating? Is the failure (event) rate increasing, decreasing, or constant in
time?“ Third, the shortcomings of statistical procedures in both situations are the same. The
trend analysis is based largely on visual assessment and performed periodically in a “snapshot”
fashion. Last, the relations between various characteristics are not analyzed which make it
difficult to gauge progress towards specific goals. There is an assortment of methodologies that
may be explored to enhance these current practices. These methods fall into four categories:
x

Basic analysis of trends performed continuously for assessment of positive or adverse
trends.
x Monitoring of trends performed automatically, reducing the need for work-intensive
manually prepared reports based on production of histograms and bar charts.
x Detailed assessment of trends performed periodically (i.e. annually) for realignment of
statistical parameters used in the basic analysis.
x Alternative risk and trend measures to provide improved insight into the condition of a
system for reaching conclusions and making decisions based on available data.

Technical Approach
Basic analysis of trends could be approached by modeling the counts Ni, i=1,…n, which
represent the number of events within the i-th time interval [ti, ti+1], as a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process ([2], [8]), i.e.
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The objective of the analysis is to make conclusions about the behavior of O (t) .
Monitoring activity would then be based on the resulting behavior of O(t) . If O (t) is a
constant or a decreasing function, the failure rate is not increasing and no actions need to be
taken, otherwise, system reliability personnel should be alerted.

The shape of O(t) can vary depending on many factors. For example, it can be an
increasing or a decreasing function, or have the “bathtub curve” U-shape. [6] The latter happens
if initially the failures are due to the defects of some repairable (replaceable) elements of the
system. As soon as these defects are corrected, the failure rate goes down until it starts increasing
again due to the aging of the system. If the system has a U-shaped failure intensity function, the
objective may be to determine whether t > t0 where t0 is the lowest point of O (t) . Another option
may be to control whether O (t) < O 0 where O 0 is a threshold chosen in advance.
Periodic detailed assessments of the condition of the system can be divided according to
the frequency of their implementation. After short fixed periods of time (for example, monthly)
or after a significant event (failure, repairs, design changes), testing could be implemented to
determine whether there is a change in the intensity function by analyzing the change point in the
sequence O1 , O 2 , L , O n using failure counts or failure time data.

Two types of methods can be used for this purpose, the change point analysis techniques
and the empirical Bayes techniques. The change point analysis [4] monitors whether any change
occurred in the distribution of event counts and identifies the direction of the change. The
empirical Bayes methods (for example, [3] and [7]) allows estimation of values of O i
corresponding to each time interval and check whether the value of O corresponding to the last
time interval is smaller than some pre-assigned value O 0 . Thus, empirical Bayes techniques
provide estimates of O i ’s necessary for insight into the current condition of a system while

change point analysis provides a tool for testing hypotheses about changes in the intensity
function O(t) .
Occasionally, analysis can be performed to re-estimate and test the shape of the intensity
function O(t) . These tasks can be accomplished using traditional frequentist or Bayesian
statistical methods. If the intensity function has a power law growth
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then O( t) is constant, increasing or decreasing depending on whether E = 1, E > 1 or E <1,
respectively. Constructing confidence intervals and testing hypotheses about E based on a F 2 pivotal quantity is a part of an American National Standard ANSI/IEC/ASQ D61164–1997 [1].
We suggest a wider class of the shapes for O (t) which include increasing, decreasing and U-type
shapes to represent O (t) :
O(t) = a1 exp(b1t)  a 2 exp(b 2 t) .

Then O (t) is an increasing function if (a 2 b 2 ) /(a1b1 ) t 1 ; a decreasing function if b1 and b2 are both
negative and have a U-shape if (a 2 b 2 ) /(a1b1 )  1 . Since it is impossible to derive a pivotal
quantity for this wider class of intensity functions, we shall perform estimation (point and
interval) as well as hypothesis testing using Bayesian methods. Introducing priors on a1, b1, a2
and b2 with unknown or random parameters (the latter technique is known as hierarchical Bayes),
we estimate the unknown parameters of the priors from data by maximizing empirical likelihood,
thus, performing parametric empirical Bayes analysis [3]. The confidence intervals are
constructed and the hypotheses are tested on the basis of the posterior distributions of a1, b1, a2
and b2 given data.
Some alternative risk and trend measurement ideas are also proposed below for
application towards improved insight for reaching conclusions and making decisions based on
available data. One concept, for which an assortment of statistical tools is available, is the
analysis of dependencies to mitigate risk and unfavorable future trends. Data sets concerning
failures of various parts of equipment as well as various data sets on safety and health of the
personnel may not be independent. Discovering hidden relationships between data sets can be
useful for influencing characteristics that can be manipulated in order to produce desirable effects
on other measures that cannot be controlled. For example, in the Safety and Health metrics there
is a high positive correlation between worktime deviation (controllable parameter) and the
number of worktime injuries (uncontrollable parameter). Understanding dependencies between
failures in various parts and systems of the Shuttle vehicles could lead to design enhancements of
the existing vehicles or lessons learned towards production of a new space vehicle.
In Spring 2002, KSC called for proposals on “A Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations
Analysis Tool”. One of the objectives of the project was to compare various shuttle designs on
the basis of the currently available data in order to improve space vehicle reliability and decrease
turnaround time. One of the possible approaches to the problem is to compare failure data for the
systems of interest while they were operating in existing space vehicles or elsewhere. For
example, we have two sets of data (event counts or failure times) for failures of two comparable

types of equipment: X1 ,L , X m and Y1 ,L , Ym . The first design is preferable to the second
whenever P = P(X < Y ) >½ if Xi, i=1,…,n and Yj, j=1,…,n are event counts, or whenever
P = P(X < Y ) < ½ if Xi, i=1,…,n and Yj, j=1,…,n are the intervals between failure times.
Constructing interval estimators for P = P(X < Y ) and testing hypotheses about P allows one to
draw conclusions about what system or design is superior to the other. Several methods exist to
accomplish such goals [5]. The problem can be generalized to vector-valued event counts or can
be formulated in terms of system reliability.

Suggested Implementation Strategies
There are some strategies that could be helpful to follow in the course of implementing
statistical analysis. First, current practice involves recreating raw bin count data each time it is
collected, and storing it electronically, on personal computers, or manually, in a paper file or
document. This makes old data sets and reports practically unavailable for later analysis. One
very important strategy in order to improve this situation is to begin maintaining the raw eventcount data in a centralized simple database, so that all prior data sets are easily accessible for
analysis.
Second, since all reports follow the same pattern, it is natural to provide a capability to
produce reports automatically on request for the specified period of time along with standard
graphic visualization tools. The available statistical procedures can then be run automatically and
present the results in these reports. In addition, statistical procedures should be ”attached” to
preparatory questions asked by the user (for example, “has the rate of lost time injures at KSC
changed in the last month?, year?”). Several statistical procedures could then be run to answer
the question. If the results of the procedures agree with each other, this gives double confidence
in the result; otherwise, visual assessment of the graphs and deeper analysis of the situation by
responsible personnel may be necessary. Once the reports are produced, they should be available
for printing if this is required, which may not always be the case.
Finally, it is necessary to identify additional key characteristics and trends in existing data
that might enhance understanding of the current situation and to provide advanced statistical tools
to extract these factors of importance. Advanced statistical tools should be attached to the data
base, described previously, enabling advanced analysis of data, such as analysis of dependencies
in data, analysis of system reliability, etc.

Conclusion
The proposed development of increasingly automated, flexible, more accurate and
multiple assessment capability tools can improve the current insight into safety and reliability of
space vehicle operations and the personnel involved. Building of an easily accessible historical
database and providing automatic procedures for evaluation of trends in existing data, continuous
monitoring of characteristics of interest and visualizing data on request allows the continued
refinement and reassessment of many safety and reliability aspects. Once an automated tool suite
is developed, reports can be produced automatically, decreasing current report production
expenses and enhancing decision support on the basis of the most current data. Thus, controlling
equipment reliability as well as monitoring health and safety of personnel can be done regularly
with decreased data analysis turnaround time.
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